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Libet et al. (1983) revealed that brain activity precedes conscious intention. For
convenience in this study, we divide brain activity into two parts: a conscious field (CF)
and an unconscious field (UF). Most studies have assumed a comparator mechanism or
an illusion of CF and discuss the difference of prediction and postdiction. We propose that
problems to be discussed here are a twisted sense of agency between CF and UF, and
another definitions of prediction and postdiction in a mediation process for the twist. This
study specifically examines the definitions throughout an observational heterarchy model
based on internal measurement. The nature of agency must be emergence that involves
observational heterarchy. Consequently, awareness involves processes having duality in
the sense that it is always open to the world (postdiction) and that it also maintains self
robustly (prediction).
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INTRODUCTION
Libet et al. (1983) reported mounting brain activity related to
a resultant action for approximately three hundred milliseconds
before subjects reported their first awareness of a conscious inten-
tion to act. In other words, conscious decisions to act were clearly
preceded by an unconscious buildup of electrical charge within
the brain. This buildup came to be called readiness potential
(RP). Such a division between the conscious field (CF) and the
unconscious field (UF) can be found in postscripts of intention
in experiments1. Stimulating particular brain regions led to reac-
tions of particular body parts without a subject’s own intention
(Delgado, 1969; Penfield, 1975). Consequently, one attributes
actions executed by others (not one’s own actions) to one’s inten-
tion (Wegner et al., 2004). These results are explained as below.
After an efferent copy of an initial motor command is gener-
ated and simulated, it is compared with afferent information
from sensory feedback as a result of actual movement. In the
case of congruence between efferent and afferent information,
it is said that one experiences a sense of agency for the move-
ment (e.g., Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 2008a,b). Here, these
studies are based on the idea of a hierarchy comprising a higher
monitoring part and a lower part executing actual movement.
Results reported for an apparent mental causal path (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003) show that that conscious
will is subject to unconscious will and the comparator model
(e.g., Wolpert et al., 1995; Frith et al., 2000a). However, the sys-
tem presumed in those studies is hierarchical, not heterarchical
(McCulloch, 1945).
1In this study, we use CF and UF in the abstract sense.
Most previous studies have specifically investigated ways
of mechanism comparing conscious intention with movement
result. When expressing the comparing mechanism as a pair of
thought–action, the pair is usually assumed as that of CF in
those earlier studies. We raise a question of whether a pair of
thought–action will be dual in brain. It means duality of the
pair in CF and UF (Figure 1). Considering that the area play-
ing a role of conscious will is just a part of brain, and that it
is separate from areas generating actual motor command. We
can accept some kind of independence between CF and UF, and
assume dual pairs of thought–action (dual operating systems).
Gunji (2013) showed that the area comparing an efferent copy
with movement results is not merely a monitoring area but rather
CF, and the RP area (UF) plays a role of execution of specific
movements preceding CF. Comparing CF, UF is absolutely others
in the brain. Gunji (2013) argued that an origin of voluntari-
ness comes from such a twisted feeling of operation. One has
a sense of being operated by others in the brain. Nevertheless,
that person finds out that the other is himself. When we have
a feeling of operation, we also face a difficulty of self-reference
that “I operate on me.” “I” operating (subjective self ) and “Me”
operated (objective self ) are strictly different in status. Thus,
“I operate on me” is fragile. Consequently, “others in the brain
(UF) operate on me” is a stronger keynote than “I (CF) oper-
ate on me.” Moreover, it should be found that the other is just
“I” (myself). We argue that the twist is an origin of the sense
of agency (SoA). Then, the other in the brain can become not
only “myself” but also “someone unknown” or “you” just in front
of me.
What is important here is the twisted viewpoint of accept-
ing a mixture of “I” (CF) and “the other” (UF) while assuming
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some mutual independence2 . As described above, the twist can
become the origin of voluntariness, but simultaneously engender
the crisis of a system such as self in autism or integration disor-
der syndrome (e.g., Frith, 1989; Frith et al., 2000b). Therefore, we
can describe a schematic model of conflict = mediation between
CF and UF or “I” and “the other” (Figure 1). Then we would
suggest that prediction and postdiction could be identified in a
process of mediation. We presume that aspects of prediction and
postdiction do not appear in previous studies (e.g., Blakemore
et al., 2002; Bays et al., 2006; Synofzik et al., 2013). Those stud-
ies examined only problems in comparing motor intention with
movement result in CF. We do not specifically examine such a
simple problem on the comparison mechanism in CF. Beyond it
we would rather specifically examine the conflict between two
FIGURE 1 | Duality of mental process.
2Many discussions based on the comparatormodel (Frith et al., 2000b) invari-
ably presume an author list, {I, Michael, Cathy, . . . }. Furthermore, we choose
only one of the authors from the fundamental list depending on our situ-
ations. We sometimes mistake a choice. For example, we choose “Michael”
instead of “I.” This paradigm shows that agency is only a mechanism with
error or illusion. However, self and others must be completely different cate-
gories. If that were not true, then the subject/object problem would disappear.
Furthermore, the problem is in subject itself. The distinction of subject and
object will be corresponded to that of CF and UF. Awareness involves the
problem in itself. Our argument is that this problem can be formalized
using set theory. The author list can correspond to a set of natural num-
bers {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Then we can place “arbitrary n” in the set where “n” is
obtained after we survey the infinite set, although we actually cannot. “n”
actually points nothing in the set. If we choose “1,” “1” is a negation of the
others (2, 3, . . .) in the set. However, “n” is a denial of the set itself. Thus,
“n” is completely different status from the other numbers. Consequently, the
placement of “n” into the set is a category mistake, but we do it easily in math-
ematics. Herein the “n” is “I” itself. The sentence “the other is I” represents a
category mistake. However, agency is beyond the logical mistake. Therefore,
we can state that the agency of “I” is emergence. In other words, “n” rep-
resents latency and “1,” possibility: “n” is changeable after chosen since it is
a meaningless sign and “1” is not changeable. We discuss the details of this
argument below in the text.
operating systems: CF and UF. Consequently, we aim to rede-
fine prediction and postdiction from the conflict in this study.
In the conflict, the difference between prediction and postdic-
tion is a gap separating “I” of CF and others in brain of UF. The
gap is just the origin of voluntariness. Prediction stands for the
aspect of equalizing “I” and others in brain by erasing the gap.
However, postdiction means the aspect of materializing the gap
as “someone” by being open to the world. In the next section, we
dissert these aspects in detail through an observational heterar-
chical model, with a dynamic hierarchy including a latent mixture
of levels.
AGENCY AND EMERGENCE
What is the nature of agency? It must be that of emergence. Our
argument expressed in this paper is that the nature of agency is
that of emergence.Other (UF) operates onme (CF). Furthermore,
I find that the other is I. This characteristic is the very emergence
of agency. However, most current discussions depend on the
comparator model (Frith et al., 2000b) that agency derives from
a mechanism, and the judgment problem of whether it occurs
before an event or after: roughly speaking, we are machines with
agency and only judge events’ timing, which sometimes reveals
errors. Themodel cannot explain a vicarious agency with no effer-
ent copy in which a person feels that one is doing something
despite actually doing nothing himself (Wegner et al., 2004). A
feeling of doing is only illusion if it is not accurate (Wegner, 2002).
Herein, we can identify a dichotomy between the two: mecha-
nism or illusion (Table 1). The problem is not abnormality or
illusion of agency but normal agency that we feel in daily life.
The daily life agency, a feeling that “I” operate on me, is not
fundamental (mechanism). Then we obtain from the nature of
emergence that the other is I 3. Consequently, the salient diffi-
culty is not a lack of experimental evidence but the concept of
emergence.
As described in this paper, we attempt to describe the nature
of agency using the notion of “observational heterarchy” (Gunji
and Kamiura, 2003, 2004). In this section, we introduce notions
of emergence. In the subsequent section, we also discuss this point
in light of the notions of “hierarchy” (Salthe, 2012) and “heterar-
chy” (Stark, 1999). In the third section, we introduce the notion
of observational heterarchy.
Notions of emergence have been discussed for a long time.
There are many definitions of emergence (O’Connor and Wong,
2012). We can identify some kinds of hierarchical structures
assume under the various notions (Barabási and Albert, 1999;
Odum and Barrett, 2004; Postle, 2006). We briefly define emer-
gent phenomenon as macroscopic patterns running through
underlying microscopic interactions. For example, when we
Table 1 | Dichotomies on the notion of awareness.
Mechanism Hierarchy Determinism
Illusion Heterarchy Vitalism
3The original category of “I” is extended to “the other is I.” In other words, {I}
is extended to {the other, I}.
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observed a population that has a new novel ability that the oth-
ers of the same species do not have, we call that observation one
of an emergent phenomenon. For explanations of such an emer-
gent phenomenon, there aremany discussions in philosophy (e.g.,
Kim, 1999; Bedau, 2008; Bitbol, 2012). However, these philosoph-
ical discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we
only show a model of observational heterarchy as one of models
of emergent phenomena in this paper4. And we discuss that the
notions of hierarchy and heterarchy cannot be models of emer-
gence and thus comparator model = mechanism (Frith et al.,
2000b) or apparent mental causation = illusion (Wegner, 2002)
cannot explain the nature of agency (Table 1).
HIERARCHY AND HETERARCHY
First, we define the notions of hierarchy and heterarchy in this
paper. Hierarchy is identifiable as some kind of order structure
of a company (Figure 2A). Cladograms of taxonomy are also
familiar 5. Therefore hierarchy is definable as a partial ordered
set (POS)6. Heterarchy is a dynamical hierarchy including of
a mixture of levels (Figure 2B). Although heterarchy is appar-
ently consistent, as in some discussions (McCulloch, 1945; Stark,
1999; Norman et al., 2010), it is inconsistent in the strict sense
of the word (Salthe, 2012). Consequently, it cannot have its
FIGURE 2 | Schematic diagram of (A) hierarchy, (B) heterarchy, (C)
observational heterarchy with compression effect, and (D)
observational heterarchy with extension effect.
4Our approach may be close to Bitbol’s interventionist-constitutive view
(Bitbol, 2012). Body is not fundamental but an observable (i.e., cognitive
boundary) for an observer even if it is his own body.Mind is the same case.We
concern about an observational process (an internal observer) for an observed
relation of some kind of two levels (e.g., body and mind), and what the prob-
lem is if we admit that a substance can be such an observer. In the notion
of internal measurement (Matsuno, 1989; Gunji, 1993, 2006), we express the
relation as a mathematical duality and weaken it by various ways for the use
in science. This dynamical duality can be an expression for the latency of
downward causation.
5Some current discussions distinguish compositional hierarchy and subsump-
tion hierarchy (Salthe, 2012).
6POS (Davey and Priestley, 2002) is defined as the following. If an element
and an order are expressed as an alphabet and ≤, respectively, POS satisfies
(1) a ≤ a, (2) a ≤ b and b ≤ a imply a = b, (3) a ≤ b and b ≤ c imply a ≤ c.
The growth mode of hierarchy (Salthe, 2012) can be expressed as applica-
tion of order-homomorphism between the POSs. It should be observational
heterarchy or contradictory (heterarchy) if not the case.
formal expression attributable to its logical flaw for the mixture
as described in the discussion presented below.
The wholeness7 that the notion of hierarchy invariably depends
on is “transcendental wholeness” (Gunji, 2006)8. Transcendental
wholeness is a privileged concept that differs from other con-
cepts because of the point that it is not permitted to have an
extent-perspective910. This wholeness seals the discussion of inter-
action between parts and a whole. Even if we discuss a hierarchical
world (system), we cannot address a variation of the world (emer-
gence). The wholeness of set theory is this transcendental one.
This notion avoids Russell’s paradox 11 and removes inter-level
interaction12. We can also identify the removal of the mixture
of levels from the notions of hierarchy (Salthe, 1985, 2012).
7Herein, the expression of the “wholeness” does not mean the whole of the
observer’s focal level. It means the whole of all of every level in a hierarchi-
cal system. By contrast, in a usual sense, “outside” and “inside” are defined,
respectively, as upper levels for the focal level and lower ones. Furthermore, an
observer in the focal level cannot know about the outsides and insides (Salthe,
2012).
8Gunji (2006) point out three aspects of generation—origin, norm, and
variation—by weaving the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari (1991), plan
d’immanence and les personnages conceptuels, and his own considerations into
his original theory of life, weak wholeness, the meditating term, and internal
observer. Herein, we refer to the concepts of “wholeness” discussed in Gunji
(2006).
9A pair of intent and extent can define the Classification concept. Intent is
an attribute of a concept. Extent is a collection of objects or specified mod-
els to which the concept is applicable. If we observe “cheese” as a concept,
then its intent is “a food derived from milk” and its extent is a collection of
“Mozzarella, Parmigiano-Reggiano, Ricotta cheese, . . . ” The pair of intent
and extent can also define a concept of a set. The intent of a set of even
numbers is “2N where N is a natural number.” The extent of the set is
“2, 4, 6, . . .”
10Try to consider the extent of wholeness = the world. The definition that
extent is a collection of objects to which a concept is applicable forces to us out
of the concept. However, we cannot observe out of wholeness = the world.
Here we can identify the impossibility of defining the extent of wholeness =
the world. “Possible world” presents us with the same case.
11Russell’s paradox is the following (Whitehead and Russell, 1925). First
define class 1 set as a set that does not include itself (itself is not one of its
elements). Next define class 2 set as a set that includes itself. For example,
English is class 2 because it includes “English.” Japanese is class 1 because it
does not include “Japanese” (this word is in English). From this distinction,
we can classify every set as class 1 or class 2. Here we makeM by collecting all
of class 1 sets.M does not include itself ifM is class 1. However, the definition
ofM means thatM, a collection of all of class 1 sets, includes itself becauseM
is class 1. Therefore, it ends up in a contradiction. Next, when we assume that
M is class 2, M includes M. However, from the definition of M , M does not
include M. This also presents a contradiction. Finally, M cannot be class1 or
class 2. This explanation shows characteristics of the Russell’s paradox.
12From the definition of a concept, a pair of intent and extent defines a set
dually. We can express the intent of a set as y = {x|A(x)} if we define A(x) as
a nature of x. Extent of the set y is x ∈ y if y is a set. Equivalence of intent and
extent is ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⇔ A(x)). Russell’s paradox can be derived easily from
this notation. The definition of the class 1 expresses A(x) as x /∈ x. From the
equivalence of intent and extent, we can obtain x ∈ y ⇔ x /∈ x. Therein, x
is arbitrary and y is special. Therefore, we can exchange x by y and obtain
y ∈ y ⇔ y /∈ y. This is Russell’s paradox. The paradox derives from the mix-
ture of elements and sets. Current set theories forbid mixture by adding the
restriction that element x is one element of arbitrary set a. Set theories define
the restriction as separation schema ∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⇔ x ∈ a ∧ A(x)).
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Consequently, the transcendental wholeness corresponds to the
concept of hierarchy.
Heterarchy is “contradictory wholeness” (Gunji, 2006). The
second wholeness implies a whole consisting of parts while defin-
ing the whole as a contraposition to the parts. Furthermore, we
obtain a contradiction of the concept. This wholeness appears in
Russell’s paradox (Whitehead and Russell, 1925). In other words,
the second wholeness permits a mixture of levels: the mixture
leads to Russell’s paradox. Consequently, this wholeness corre-
sponds to the notions of heterarchy that permit the mixture
(McCulloch, 1945; Stark, 1999; Norman et al., 2010).
What is the difference between a transcendental wholeness and
a contradictory one? It is the restriction of extent-perspective: a
mixture of levels. Contradictory wholeness is an unrestrictive ver-
sion of transcendental wholeness. The difference appears when
we examine the “whole” of a description (a system or hierarchy).
In Russell’s paradox, when we survey the whole of all sets, the
difference appears13. The difference is latent until we survey the
whole of the description of sets. Roughly speaking, it had been
latent until Russell found it. Here, we emphasize that the dif-
ference between the two notions of wholeness is not limited in
mathematics. For the discussions presented above, we correspond
hierarchy and heterarchy, respectively, to the comparator model
(Frith et al., 2000b) = mechanism, and the apparent mental cau-
sation (Wegner andWheatley, 1999)= illusion. Determinism and
vitalism are the same case (Table 1). In understanding of history,
we also divide human history into two parts—stable periods and
change periods—. We understand it through alternation of the
first wholeness and the second wholeness. In such a dichotomy
between the two, we can identify the fragile relation between affir-
mation of the world (stable period) and negation of the world
(change period) to ascertain the wholeness of history comprehen-
sively. Here we can expect the key that connects the two notions
of wholeness as two different phases that comprise the nature of
the world and of our understanding of the world.
OBSERVATIONAL HETERARCHY
What should we do about the problem that emergent phenom-
ena are beyond description (the first and second wholeness)? We
cannot describe the phenomena. However, we, herein, strive to
reveal the nature of emergence. The key to the problem must
be reconsideration of the concept of wholeness that description
is based on. Description invariably accompanies the notion, but
remains outside of it. However, system theories construct models
without consideration of this characteristic of description. The
models are based on a transcendental viewpoint by which an
emergent element (component or one level) derives from inside
of the description (Figure 3A). We do not designate this picture
as one showing emergence. Therefore, we reconsider the nature of
description with internal measurement (Matsuno, 1989; Gunji,
1993; Gunji et al., 1997) in which an emergent element origi-
nates from outside of the description (Figure 3B). We express the
characteristic by an agent’s apparent reference of its description,
13In Russell’s paradox, we first assumed that we could check all sets and divide
them into two types of sets according to whether a set can include itself (class
2) or not (class 1). This assumption engenders a contradiction in Russell’s
argument. We mean this assumption as looking over a description of sets.
FIGURE 3 | Observer with partial knowledge (inner square of line or
dotted line) is inside of the description and emergent properties
originate from somewhere: schematic diagram of (A) transcendental
view and (B) internal measurement.
which seems to lead to a self-referential paradox (without this
reference, the transcendental perspective reappears). Moreover,
we construct invalidation of the paradox by a frame problem.
Nevertheless, the model remains a mere description. Therefore,
our construction is a model that implies the nature of emergence.
Specifically we use weak duality of intent- and extent-perspectives
of a description. In this section, we introduce the notion of obser-
vational heterarchy (Gunji and Kamiura, 2003, 2004) as the third
wholeness: “weak wholeness” (Gunji, 2006)14. This third notion
of wholeness connects the other two. In the discussion presented
above, the first and second wholeness appear in Russell’s paradox:
a mixture of levels. Thus, we reconsider this mixture.
Although the notion of heterarchy sounds contradictory, it
aims at the nature of emergence: a mixture of levels. Why do we
specifically examine the mixture? We do so because it is not lim-
ited in the problem of an abstract concept.We can find, in biology,
some evidence that we can call not developments but evolutions.
Important evidence for it is adaptive mutation (Shapiro, 1997,
2002). Splitting enzymes for sugar are controlled by an operon on
14In Cantor’s diagonal argument (Moore, 1991), Cantor used the argument
to extend the notion of a cardinal number. The argument only shows a con-
tradiction of a statement for which the size of an infinite set S and that of
the power set of S (the set of all partial sets of S) are the same. However, this
negative argument led to the new limit of infinity (countable infinity) inmath-
ematics. We herein identify a positive creation from the negative argument in
the working of mathematicians. Gunji (2006) reconsidered a meaning of the
diagonal argument to clarify the concept of internal observer who bears a pos-
itive meaning of negation (the notion of weak wholeness). In the argument,
two kinds of “wholeness” of all of infinite bit strings are identified. “Intent-
wholeness” is defined by some kind of counting operation ({1, 2, 3,. . .}) and
“extent-wholeness” by its use ({. . ., n, . . .}) for a comparison with an inverted
diagonal bit string. Roughly speaking, intent-wholeness is a set of all of infinite
strings before the comparison of each of all strings in the argument. Extent-
wholeness is one after the comparison. Therefore, we define “weak wholeness”
as a notion that is intermediate of intent-wholeness and extent-wholeness.
For example, Cantor creates the new limit of infinity (countable infinity) for
an intermediate of them from the diagonal argument. Consequently, obser-
vational heterarchy with weak wholeness has intent- and extent-perspectives
explicitly (Gunji and Kamiura, 2003, 2004).
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DNA. If it switches on, an enzyme is expressed, if it is switched off,
then it is not. In the experiment of adaptive mutation, Escherichia
coli bacteria are cultured in culture media with sugar. The DNA
of bacteria is converted not to express the splitting enzyme cor-
responding to the sugar. The bacteria have difficulty surviving
because of the absence of the enzyme, which gives rise to a mal-
function of the DNA–protein system. The mutation rate becomes
high, and mutation hits the broken gene corresponding to the
splitting enzyme for the sugar. Consequently, the bacteria can
acquire the ability to use the sugar as energy source. DNA is defin-
able as a higher level than cell interactions corresponding to the
wasting state because proteins (enzymes) control the interactions
and DNA also control the proteins in the bacteria. For adaptive
mutation, the cell interactions affect DNA’s behaviors directly,
whereas DNA usually controls them through the enzyme. Here
we can identify an apparent mixture or interaction of different
levels—DNA and cells—in the bacteria. Furthermore, it can be
expressed as two processes that do not involve hierarchy or het-
erarchy. When a malfunction of the DNA–protein system occurs
in a focal level, the cell level, the DNA mutation rate becomes
high in the upper level: the DNA level (Figure 2C). Consequently,
the mutation hits the broken gene in the upper level and the
splitting enzyme becomes activated at the focal level (Figure 2D).
This image motivates us to consider the notion of observational
heterarchy as a robust model for a mixture of levels.
Here we quote the summary of observational heterarchy pre-
sented in Gunji and Kamiura (2003) below.
(1) Heterarchy15 consists of two levels and inter-level operations. (2)
Simultaneous interaction among levels is defined as simultaneous
choice that is expressed as a surjective map from a set of one level to a
set of inter-level operations. (3) Simultaneous choice implies the col-
lapse of the logical framework; then heterarchy is regarded as a system
inheriting logical collapse. (4) Because of the logical collapse, heter-
archy gives rise to re-organization of the structure. (5) Heterarchy is
not a real entity but it results from the interaction between an object
and an observer. Two levels are fundamentally an intent-perspective
and extent-perspective16.
Observational heterarchy is not only an abstract notion but also
a computational model. The model is the time-state-scale re-
entrant system (TSSRS) (Gunji et al., 2008; Sasai and Gunji, 2008)
consisting of two perspectives: one is a logical self-reference para-
dox derived from an external observer (Figure 2C); the other is
a frame-problem derived from an internal observer (Figure 2D).
The logical self-reference paradox is a mixture of levels, whole
15In this quote, “heterarchy” means observational heterarchy.
16In the usual case, Intent and Extent are defined when a concept is being
given. However, we generalize it here and consider the Intent and Extent that
give a concept. We refer the definition by Gunji and Kamiura (2003) below.
Definition (Generalized Intent and Extent): Given a concept, Intent is defined
as a collection of attributes of the concept, and Extent is defined as a collection
of objects to which the concept is applied. Conversely, given two collections of
attributes and objects, if each object has all attributes and each attribute con-
tributes to all objects, a pair of collections is called a pair of Intent and Extent.
Then we say that Intent and Extent constitutes a concept. The operations by
which an attribute in Intent is applied to an object in Extent are called inter-
level operations. A triplet,<Intent, Extent, inter-level operation> constitutes
a concept.
of system (time-scale) and subsystem levels (state-scale). In a
dynamical system, behavior of a system is expressed as a time
development of its state. However, the state is obtainable only
from the system’s boundary condition in which only the upper
level, a theorist, can provide. An operation of developing the
state of the system (time development: time-scale) and that of
providing the state (boundary condition: state-scale) is indepen-
dent. TSSRS make the two operations re-entrant and invalidate
the self-reference paradox (Figure 2C). The invalidation provides
re-framing of the system by changing boundary conditions that
mean invalidation of the frame-problem (Figure 2D).
In observational heterarchy, mediation of the self-reference
paradox (a mixture of levels) provides re-framing of hierarchical
structures, compression effect (Figure 2C) and an extension
effect (Figure 2D) (we will define these notions in the next
section). Here, it is noteworthy that we can identify a re-framing
in the nature of agency (Wegner, 2002; Wegner et al., 2004).
Consequently, there must be a mediating process of an apparent
mixture of levels, observational heterarchy, in the nature of
agency. Now, for discussions, we defined some hierarchical
structures in light of agency. Figure 4A presents three structures
in which upper components correspond to upper levels: CF
interprets UF, our thoughts include my thought, and maps
are applicable to elements 17. Figures 4B,C show re-framing
phenomena in the observational heterarchy: “I” operates on me
(Figure 4B), and “you” or “someone” operates onme (Figure 4C).
In the next section, we explain the application of observational
heterarchy to a mental causal path (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999;
Wegner, 2003) and resolve it.
OBSERVATIONAL MENTAL CAUSAL PROCESS
A mental causal path can be formalized as follows. In a case of
body movement, “thought” is an intention to move and “action”
FIGURE 4 | (A) Assumed hierarchies on which observational heterarchy is
based in this paper: abstract brain activity (left), All thought category in
mental processes (middle), and Sets category (right). (B) Observational
heterarchy with a compression effect in thought category: “I operate on
me” (usual agency). (C) Observational heterarchy with an extension effect
in the thought category: “You operate on me” or “Someone operates
on me.”
17From Libet et al. (1983), RP precedes conscious intention. In our descrip-
tion, UF precedes CF. We can say that UF converted actions and that CF
interprets the actions. This sketch can also be used to identify aspects of the
comparator model (Frith et al., 2000b). Interpretation indicates an order rela-
tion (Salthe, 2012). Therefore, CF is higher than UF. However, we mean some
kind of order relation in which a mixture of levels is latent.
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is an objective movement (Figure 5A) (movement usually con-
sists of a pair of a body part and a content of the movement,
but now the body part represents the pair). Executing a move-
ment means mapping an intention to a body part (right arm)
that is 0 (intention) → 0 (right arm) (Figure 5A). Simultaneous
choice can be found in the mixture between thought and the
mental causal path (mapping of thought–action). It is unavoid-
able that one realizes movement of a particular body part and not
moving other parts simultaneously when one executes a move-
ment. That means raising the right hand while not raising the left
hand. We do not simply raise the right hand without keeping the
left hand to balance our posture when raising the right hand. In
other words, we cannot separate mapping an intention to a body
part from mapping no intention to other parts. However, several
mapping exist, we must consider all combinations between each
element of a thought set and each of the action set (Details are
in the next section). In other words, we choose one path (map-
ping) from the path set concurrently with choosing an intention
(element) from the thought set. In sum, we conduct some kind
of logically impossible operation by simultaneously choosing an
element at lower level and mapping at a higher level (In usual
computations, the element is substituted into prepared mapping
after selected). This operation corresponds with simultaneous
choice in observational heterarchy.
Following the summary of observational heterarchy (1)–(5)
presented above, we summarize the application specifically
(Figures 5A–C).
1. Define a set of value for the thought and the action as St =
{0(intention), 1(not intention)}, and Sa= {0(right arm), 1(left
arm)}, respectively. We designate all possible operations from
the thought to the action Path-0, -1, -2, and -3, in the set of the
mental causal path. Operations are defined as follows.
Path-0: 0 → 0; 1 → 0,Path-1: 0 → 1; 1 → 1,
Path-2: 0 → 0; 1 → 1,Path-3: 0 → 1; 1 → 0.
Then, we obtain the path set as Sp = {Path-0, Path-1, Path-2,
Path-3}.
2. Assuming a mixture of different levels (sets of the thought and
path), these two sets are mutually identified. Consequently,
one-to-one correspondence is needed. That requires a surjec-
tive map from the thought set to the path set18. (Because the
converse case is clearly possible, we omit that case here).
3. One-to-one correspondence between these two sets involves
a logical collapse because the two sets differ in size (path set
is a power set of thought set). Therefore, the thought set is
smaller than the path set because the former has only two ele-
ments but the latter has four elements. For instance, if we map
0 to path-0 and 1 to path-1, respectively, no element exists in
the thought set that can map to path-2 or path-3 (Figure 5A).
Then the difference in size leads to the impossibility of one-to-
one correspondence. Logical collapse can be inferred from the
simultaneous choice (the mixture of different levels).
4. However, re-organization through a mediation process should
occur here. Specifically for sets of thought and path, two solu-
tions exist: one is extension of the thought set and the other
is compression of the path set19. In a case of extension, a set
can be re-organized by adding two other elements (someone)
18Simultaneous choice is the definition of mixture of different levels and that
expressed as a mapping. Mapping is defined as an operation from domain to
codomain. Domain and codomain can be regarded as having different status,
such as a start point and a target. Mixtures of different levels mean those of
these two. The set defining a map is required domain and codomain dually.
Furthermore, the map is not unidirectional but bidirectional, and then it also
has nature of duality. Considering these requirements, isomorphic (bijective)
mapping is a necessary and sufficient condition: Because mappings for all
elements must be defined according to the requirement that a domain is a
codomain, a surjective map is needed. If it is not injective map, it becomes
one to many mapping in the opposite direction. Thereby an injective map is
needed. As a result of the use of a surjective map and injective map needs, a
bijective map is required.
19Gunji and Kamiura (2003, 2004) emphasized only the extension effect in re-
organization derived from a mixture in observational heterarchy. This paper,
however, indicates also a compression effect as a result of careful consideration
of the mixed situation. We reconsider the difference between these two aspects
as the difference between postdiction and prediction.
FIGURE 5 | (A) Extension of thought/action set. (B) Compression of path set. (C) Development of observational heterarchy.
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from out of the set (Figure 5A). Results show that the value
in the thought set changes from {0, 1} to {0, 1, 2 (someone),
3}. Conversely in a case of compression, the path set of two
elements can be reconstructed by reducing path-2 and path-3
from the original set of four elements. Consequently, this set of
two corresponds with the thought set of two (Figure 5B). This
solution is temporary. Therefore, reconstruction of elements
and maps should occur after resolving it.
5. As described above, observational heterarchy is not an actual
entity but something observed by internal measurement.
Therefore, sets of thought and action have intent-perspective
and extent- perspective, similarly to internal (cause) and exter-
nal (effect) descriptions in behavior. Consequently, the mental
causal path can be resolved by application of the observational
heterarchy model.
We present a development of the mental causal path as an obser-
vational heterarchy (Figure 5C). Usually, we can act as we intend
to. A pair of thought–action as a mental causal path is realized
here. In other words, intent–perspective is consistent with extent–
perspective as a behavior. However, this assertion of consistency
is merely an approximation. Simultaneous choices between intra-
level and inter-level are latent in such a normal condition. It
appears under abnormal conditions in experiments.
The apparent mixture of different hierarchical levels can be
shown in the problem of self-referential mixture between the
thought set and path set. As described at the beginning, however,
the system never collapses despite some kind of self-referential
condition. Themixture results in a collapse in logic, but not in the
living systems. The body (system) never engenders collapse but
engenders one-to-one correspondence by making consistence.
This feature is called robustness. That means to engender one-
to-one correspondence can be regarded as reconstruction of a set
(frame). Such a reconstruction cause can be formally interpreted
as two aspects, compression and extension of a set. As described
below, we suggest that these two aspects of mediation of one-
to-one correspondence correspond, respectively, with prediction
and postdiction. Postdiction can be understood as the aspect of
extension effect like a rubber-hand illusion (e.g., Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), out-of-body experi-
ence (e.g., Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007)
or embodiment of instruments (e.g., Iriki et al., 1996; Maravita
and Iriki, 2004; Sonoda et al., 2012). However, prediction can
be understood as the aspect of a compression effect that com-
presses various interpretations related to cause set attenuation of
sensation. Details will be described later. In sum, postdiction and
prediction are not problems of the comparison mechanisms, but
are instead derived from the perceptual difference in mediation of
conflict between CF and UF as to agency.
POSTDICTION AND PREDICTION
When we devote attention to experimental data of postdiction,
we can find the extension process that specific experimental
conditions cause unexpected feeling for observers. For instance,
alien hand (e.g., Banks et al., 1989; Wegner, 2002; Biran and
Chatterjee, 2004) or table turning (Wegner, 2002) are feelings
of being moved by someone unknown. They can just arise for
actors with thought extension. These examples show extension
of the thought set (SoA). The following are examples of exten-
sion as to the action set [Sense of Ownership (SoO)]. The I-spy
study (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999) or vicarious agency experi-
ment (Wegner et al., 2004) shows the illusion of agency by which
a subject feels SoA despite not operating by him in fact. These
phenomena are regarded as illusions in the attribution of inten-
tion. Thereby they can be regarded as extension actions because a
subject’s attribution of their intention to action by others means
that they choose elements from outside of the action set. Thus,
it can be regarded as extension of SoO to some extent. This
corresponds with the case in which a new element appears as
presented in Figure 5A. The aspects will correspond with exten-
sion of SoO as reported by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and by
Lenggenhager et al. (2007). Regarding visual awareness, Eagleman
and Sejnowski (2000) reported the perception of a ring trajectory
despite its absence in fact. As described above, it is also regarded
as extension effect.
In a case of prediction, the compression process can be iden-
tified. We can observe it in the experiment reported by Bays
et al. (2006). Attenuation of the sensation was observed by self-
generated tactile means. In brief, this observation indicates that
sensation by touch becomes weaker when one touches one’s
own hand by oneself than when touched by others. Bays et al.
(2006) constructed an apparatus consisting of a torque motor to
realize two conditions: self-generated tactile (contact trial) and
non self-generated tactile conditions (no-contact and delay trial).
In the apparatus, when the right finger presses the button, the
torque begins to rotate, resulting in the left finger being pressed
(pulse). They differentiated self-generated tactile conditions with
non-self-generated one by manipulating the duration between
the time of button press and that of torque rotation in mil-
liseconds. Therefore, without delay, it becomes a self-generated
condition even though the torque intermediates (contact trial).
With delay, it becomes a non-self-generated condition (delay
trial). It becomes a no-contact condition if the button is out of
alignment. At the moment if a sensor device senses the finger
movement and it actuates the motor and presses left finger, the
same finger movement can cause a pulse (no-contact trial). In
the no-delay condition, when a subject’s finger contacts the but-
ton (contact trial) that is a self-generated tactile condition. But,
whekin a subject’s finger does not contact the button (no-contact
trial), which means a non-self-generated tactile in the sense of
postdiction. Note that attenuation of sensation is observed in the
self-generated tactile condition. However, identical results were
shown not only in the contact trial but also in the no-contact
trial (Experiment 1 in Table 2). Therefore, it was concluded that
attenuation of sensation was not postdictive but predictive.
Note the assumption that the difference between contact and
non-contact is discriminated after the button press event. Then
the fact of attenuation despite the discrimination indicates that
this perception is not postdictive but predictive. The problem here
is the assumption of discrimination after the event. Although the
discrimination indicates whether it is self-generated or not by
contact, it is the problem that the discrimination and the pulse
are perceptually in synchrony. How to address this synchronicity
is a problem. In other words, we can find the problem of how we
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Table 2 | Summary of results of Bays et al. (2006).
Pretrail Posttrail Attenuation
Experiment 1 Contact Delay ×
No-contact ©
Experiment 2 No Delay ×
No-contact ×
can interpret a causality of button press and pulse in the exper-
imental setting (upper left side in Figure 6A). What we should
devote attention to here be the fact that the compression process
of interpretation, the contact trial, was regarded as the same trial
as the non-contact trial. Moreover we should confirm the result
that attenuation of sensation (interpretation of self-generated tac-
tile) was not observed in the no-contact trial without a contact
trial in the other experiment of Bays et al. (2006) (Experiment 2 in
Table 2).
Following Gunji and Kamiura (2004), we try to
describe this situation with division into internal descrip-
tion (Intent) based on subjective report and external
one (Extent) based on orders of objective events 20.
In this description, we use lattice structure (Davey and Priestley,
2002) and an order relation is a mental path (time) such as
event A-event B when event A occurs before event B 21. In
the contact trial, both Intent and Extent became the contact–
attenuation order, mental path (time) shown in Figure 6A (upper
right side). In the no-contact trial, however, Extent became a
partial order set where, for simultaneous feeling of no contact
and pulse, they have no order relation, as shown in Figure 6A
20McTaggart (1989), a philosopher, proposed a model for subjective and/or
cognitive time. He evaluated two kinds of models, called A series and B series.
The B series consist of events linearly ordered, and is designed by “before” and
“after,” on one hand. The A series consists of past, present and future which
cannot co-exist and exclusive with each other, on the other hand. This original
pair of the A and B series is utilized as a causal set (Bombelli et al., 1987)
and its semantics in the field of quantum mechanics (Markopoulou, 2000),
independent of philosophy. Gunji et al. (2009) studied a relation or interaction
of the two series. In that study, both the series are defined as lattices (Davey
and Priestley, 2002).
21We show the definition of causal set, partially ordered set (POS), and lattice,
in brief. A causal set consist of separable events. Each event can be connected
by another event via a directed edge without loops. If two events are connected
by two edges that have different directions, they are equivalent to each other.
Thus, these particular directed networks can be expressed as a POS (Davey and
Priestley, 2002). If an event and directed edge are expressed as an alphabet and
≤, respectively, POS satisfies (1) a ≤ a, (2) a ≤ b and b ≤ a imply a = b, (3)
a ≤ b and b ≤ c imply a ≤ c. For lattice, we also add some terminologies. Any
elements a and b in a POS, P, are anti-chain with each other if neither a ≤ b
nor b ≤ a does not hold. For any subsets Q ⊆ P, join of Q, denoted by ∨
Q is defined by such that for any q ∈ Q, q ≤ ∨Q and if q ≤ s, then ∨Q ≤ s.
Especially, if Q is a two elements set such as {a, b}, ∨{a, b} is represented by
a ∧ b. Similarly meet of Q, denoted by ∧Q is defined by such that for any
q ∈ Q, q ≥ ∧Q and if q ≥ s, then ∧Q ≥ s. Especially, ifQ is a two elements set
such as {a, b}, ∧{a, b} is represented by a ∧ b. Given a partially order set, P,
if for any x, y ∈ P, x ∧ y, x ∨ y ∈ P , then P is called a lattice. For example, a
four elements lattice { a, b, c, d} such as that in Figure 6A (left side) has order
relations {a ≤ b, a ≤ c, b ≤ d, c ≤ d, b and c are anti-chain}.
FIGURE 6 | (A) Process of attenuation of sensation. (B) Process of choice
blindness.
(upper left side). At this moment, the order of intention–
attenuation might be readily apparent. No contact and pulse
were arranged between them. In other words, because there
were obvious order relations such as intention—no-contact
and intention—pulse, these relations should be described as
the lattice structure depicted in Figure 6A (upper left side).
Considering mapping to Intent, several interpretations exist
(groupings)22. Because contact and intention were trained by
repetition, no contact and intention would be grouped in Extent
(lower left side in Figure 6A). Intent of no-contact—attenuation
would be formed (lower right side in Figure 6A). In a no-contact
trial, appearance of contradiction between no contact and pulse
as to the order relation can trigger the compression of inter-
pretation. We can consider the compression as derived from by
repetition in contact trial because the finger movements of no-
contact trial are same as those of contact trial (Experiment 1
in Table 2). Note that, in the advance contact trial, grouping
between contact and intention is not so readily apparent but
trained. In fact, even in the contact trial, attenuation can never be
22Considering lattice-homomorphism from Extent to Intent, there are four:
(1) {all elements} → {attenuation}, (2) {all elements} → {no-contact},
(3) {no contact, attenuation} → {attenuation}; {intention, pulse} → {no-
contact} (4) {no contact, intention} → {no-contact}; {attenuation, pulse} →
{attenuation}.
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observed with delay. Alternatively, in the no-contact trial, atten-
uation is not observed either without contact trial (Experiment 2
in Table 2).
Are postdiction and prediction mutually independent effects?
No. They must be just concurrent effects, but different in
their own ways. Specifically they play different roles in the re-
organization of sensation and perception. We explain this in a
choice blindness experiment (Johansson et al., 2005). If the exper-
imenter changed a picture that a subject had chosen to another
one in secret, then subjects made up a reason for why they chose
it even though they actually did not choose it. Again we try to
describe this situation with division into Intent and Extent. In
Intent, before changing to the other picture, order was reason
A – choice A (upper right side in Figure 6B). After the change,
it became reason B – choice B (lower right side in Figure 6B).
In Extent, after the change, representing a fake picture and fake
result of choice were sure (presentation B – choice B), whereas
reason B and intention were unsure (left side in Figure 6B).
By compression playing a role of prediction, reason B – choice
B were reflected in Intent (right pointing arrow). However, it
was impossible without producing reason B by extension: a role
of postdiction (left pointing arrow). Consequently, it is con-
cluded that postdiction and prediction emerge as the difference
of two aspects of extension and compression in the organization
of causality, even in the experimentally manipulated contradic-
tive situation. Therefore, we are always internal observers. When
perceiving a world that we cannot supervise, our perceptions
necessarily accompany both postdiction and prediction.
APPLICATIONS OF OUR FRAMEWORKS TO EXPERIMENTAL
PARADIGMS
Our frameworks of awareness will be testable within some exper-
imental paradigms, based on a gap or mixture of different sen-
sational/perceptional information (intent-/extent-perspective).
Specifically, they predict re-framing of thought/action set in a
mental causal path (Table 3) 23. SoA and SoO will be corre-
sponded to a thought and action set, respectively. Their dynamical
duality relation (re-framing of the sets) can be derived from
our frameworks naturally. Although there are some discussions
about a relation between SoA and SoO (e.g., Gallagher, 2000;
Tsakiris et al., 2006), they cannot predict such re-framings com-
prehensively. Additionally, ours can derive out of body expe-
rience (OBE) (Blanke and Mohr, 2005) and sleep paralysis
(Santomauro and French, 2009) jointly while the other frame-
works do not even mention their relation. In our frameworks,
OBE and sleep paralysis is corresponded to extreme version of
extension effect and compression one for re-framing of an action
set (SoO), respectively24.
23Although we described a compression effect for interpretations (maps)
in the discussion presented above, we can also presume the effect for
thought/action sets (elements) according to a mediation process, e.g. in a case
of an extreme compression for maps.
24In both OBE and sleep paralysis, one is fully awareness. Thus, agency
seems to be unchanged. Ownership associated with cognitive body would be
changed to some kind of a compressed (unmovable) body in sleep paralysis
and an extended (out of) body in OBE. These extreme offsets of SoO may
cause an abnormal body feeling.
Table 3 | Experimental paradigms derived from our framework.
Intention Action
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme
Compression Ouija board Automatism Disownership Sleep
paralysis
Extension Hypnotism Group will Embodiment Out of body
experience
For the re-framing of thought sets, one feels oneself oper-
ated by someone (hypnotism), group will, something like a ghost
(Ouija board), or nothing (automatism) (Wegner, 2002) 25. For
the re-framing of action sets i.e., cognitive body frame, disown-
ership (de Vignemont, 2011) and embodiment (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998) are famous and our frameworks also predict sleep
paralysis and OBE (Table 3). Although there are eight experi-
mental paradigms from our prediction, six out of eight have
been already established and herein we only show the rest of
them, sleep paralysis and OBE. Our frameworks correspond to
the below experimental paradigms: extension effect—OBE, and
compression effect—sleep paralysis.
OUT-OF-BODY EXPERIENCE (TEST OF EXTENSION EFFECT)
A particular subjective sensation called “out-of-body experience
(OBE)” was reported (e.g., Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Their procedures were based on
mixture between visual and haptic information through a head
mount display (HD) that showed subject’s own back touched
by a stick in real time. In this section, we introduce a new pre-
liminary construction (Gunji et al., 2013) that causes a feeling
of OBE, which differs from that of the previous studies. They
used the system of substituted reality (SR) (Suzuki et al., 2012).
Their experimental design is based on mixture of subjective and
objective view. This design matches with our frameworks.
The SR system consists of multiple video cameras, recorder,
and HD. In their design of OBE, a subject sitting in a room wears
a helmet-type HD equipped with a subject-eye camera. He first
sees an experimenter in front of him with naked eye, and after
wearing HD he sees subjective viewed scene via HD. After that,
the scene recorded by the objective eye cameras set in front of
him is projected in HD. The subjective view and objective view
are exclusive with each other, although they are both sides of the
same coin—“now.” They cannot be united by a single event in this
situation. However, if he experiences continuous change between
objective and subjective cameras, he can feel that he himself exists
in his own subjective view. In a preliminary experiment, a sub-
ject can feel OBE in the situation. That is not just an experience
in which a subject can see himself. He can feel that he creates
objective view as if it was his lucid dream. Therefore, in this
feeling exclusive subjective and objective scenes are united as a
25Although this classification is expedient, we think that it is suggestive. In
the classification, Ouija board is expressed as a compression effect since one
may feel ghost’s agency and its presence is not strong. Automatism is the same
case. By the way, we can also assume that an extreme concentration in sports
as an example of automatism instead of questionable studies of automatism
(Wegner, 2002).
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single event, different from the feeling experienced in the previous
studies.
Themixture of subjective and objective scene leads the integra-
tion of the two scenes, and a subject gets objective view in which
he can see himself. Then, an expanding “self ” who has objective
view, out of the body, appears. Note that self is a relation of the
world andme. This paradigm of OBE demands to switch from the
concept that self is reliable to the new one that self is flexible. This
is the self who can expand itself in our frameworks. The paradigm
of materializing the gap of subjective and objective view as ones
lucid dream may also give an understanding of depersonalization
disorder (Lambert et al., 2002).
SLEEP PARALYSIS (TEST OF COMPRESSION EFFECT)
Sleep paralysis is a consciously experienced paralysis either when
going to sleep or waking up. During an episode, one is fully
conscious, able to open ones eyes but aware that it is not pos-
sible to move limbs, head or trunk (Dahlitz and Parkes, 1993;
Santomauro and French, 2009). Sleep paralysis can be considered
to be an intrusion of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep charac-
teristics into wakefulness. That is, the muscles of the body are
deeply relaxed and they cannot be moved with ease, and the
dreamlike element with hallucinations may result from the brain
activity “dreaming” that is typical of this sleep period (Dement
and Kleitman, 1957). Putting it simply, there is a gap between
the conscious activity in the brain and the deeply relaxing body:
the gap may cause the unmovable body with consciousness. Note
that one can move his relaxing body in normal sleep and cannot
in sleep paralysis. Consequently, here is the self who compresses
oneself into the unmovable body, a compressed self. This self
contrasts to that of OBE.
There is currently no known way to induce sleep-onset REM
periods, which have been found to be associated with sleep paraly-
sis (Santomauro and French, 2009). But, note that the SR systems
can cause a feeling of a lucid dream to some extent by contin-
uous changing between subjective and objective view. Although
there is no evidence, the SR system could cause a sleep paraly-
sis like experience. It would need careful designs. One of them
may be a continuous change between a real time scene (he see
his moving body) and a recorded one (he sees not moving body),
which causes some degrees of a gap between intention to move
and resultant movement like in sleep paralysis. A subject could
mediate the gap by not moving his body with a feeling in his
lucid dream. If we could develop these methods, they might have
an effect to retain behaviors to some extent. Consequently, with
these methods, we could apply them to retrain behavioral dis-
orders such as hyperactivity disorder for rehabilitations. These
applications may be contrast to a “mirror box” that can cause
movement of unmovable phantom limbs (Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996).
CONCLUSION
A self-referential problem ofmixture between different levels (ele-
ment and map) can be mediated in two processes: compression
and extension of a system. However, we should not regard them
simply as different effects at the same level. We do not consider
observational heterarchy simply as the model that can account for
both postdiction and prediction, considering the fact that element
and map have originally different status. Mediation of compres-
sion is compression of map, which means that one maintains the
attitude that “the world is just what I predicted” even if incon-
sistency exists in the map (interpretation). However, mediation
of extension is extension of an element, which means the de-
construction of the frame of self for inconsistency. Compression
is a transcendental viewpoint that enforces institutionalization
from the outside, whereas extension is an internal measurement
that intends to make some adjustment from the inside. These
two aspects are different levels in the mediation process. In this
sense, prediction and postdiction are not mechanisms for the
event (a normal feeling of doing is not fundamental because we
can feel it even if without an efferent copy), but rather represent
difference in the aspect of mediation. Consider the situation in
which conscious will and unconscious will come together and an
inconsistency appears. Prediction is the aspect that conscious will
maintains the process persistently. Then “I” equal “the other in
my brain.” Conversely postdiction is the aspect by which con-
scious will is threatened and enforced by unconscious will to
adjust. Then the gap separating “I” and “the other in my brain”
is materialized as “someone.”
Consequently, awareness can be found in such a conflict
between conscious will (CF) and unconscious will (UF) that
engender origin of voluntariness. It should be identified as a
process having duality in the sense that it opens the world
(postdiction) and that it closes (prediction).
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